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Studies of corporate governance are concerned with two features of modern shareholding: diffuse
ownership and the resulting separation of ownership and control, which potentially leads to  managerial
self-dealing; and, majority shareholding, which potentially mitigates some managerial self-dealing
but opens the door for the expropriation of minority shareholders. This paper provides a study of the
second issue for nineteenth-century US corporations. It investigates two related questions. First, did
voting rules that limited the control rights of large shareholders encourage diffuse ownership? It did.
Second, did diffuse ownership systematically alter bank risk taking? It did.  Banks with less concentrated
ownership followed policies that reduced liquidity and bankruptcy risk.
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Voting Rights, Share Concentration and Leverage at Nineteenth-Century US Banks
1. Introduction
In the Modern Corporation and Private Property Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means (1932)
drew attention to what they considered a disturbing phenomenon: the separation of ownership and
control  in  the  large,  modern  corporation.  They  were  troubled  by  the  trend  toward  great
accumulations of wealth contributed by diffuse owners and directed by insular managers. The
separation of ownership and control had "effectively broken the old property relationships” (Berle
and Means 1968, 4). Strong managers, freed from the oversight of weak owners, had ample
opportunity to pursue policies inconsistent with maximum firm value (Roe 1994). In 1968, reflecting
on his earlier conclusions, Berle had grown more rather than less concerned by trends in corporate
control. "Directors of the corporation," he wrote, "are not the owners; they are not [even] agents of
the [owners] and are not obliged to follow their instructions. (Berle and Means 1968, ix). Absent
effective oversight, managers were free to pursue policies that generated utility for them without
creating benefits for owners; in short, managers were free to self-deal.
Several recent histories of early corporations find that the earliest corporations were not beset
with self-dealing managers (Miwa and Ramseyer 2000; Hilt 2008; Musacchio 2009). Because boards
of directors were dominated by large shareholders who exercised control over daily operations, large
shareholders did not face the collective action problem that plagues managerial monitoring at modern,
multidivisional, multinational corporations. Managerial self-dealing was not the central corporate
governance issue of the nineteenth century that it became in the twentieth century. Rather, the central-3-
concern of the earlier era was the potential for self-dealing by large, often controlling shareholders.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Morck (2000) note that controlling shareholders will be more
interested in maximizing personal utility rather than firm value and will use a firm's resources to serve
their ends at the expense of minority shareholders.
Fears of expropriation by majority shareholders among minority shareholders in America's
nineteenth-century banks were a continuing concern. The Canal Bank of Albany (New York), for
example, declared bankruptcy in 1848 (New York State Comptroller 1848). The trustee appointed
by the court later reported that 4 of the 5 largest shareholders were directors who controlled 22
percent of the bank's shares.  The directors used their insider position at the bank to direct its
resources to their own use in that the directors' indebtedness to the bank as borrowers or co-signors
represented more than half the bank's outstanding loans, many of which were secured by overvalued
mortgages. More troubling, perhaps, was that 10 percent of the bank's assets were simply missing;
that is, once the trustee made sense of the poorly kept books, recorded assets fell 10 percent short
of liabilities plus capital. Further, the trustee reported that the bank's  employees were poorly
supervised, and the cashier (chief operating officer) and tellers borrowed money from the bank at low
rates without good collateral. The trustee anticipated that the bank's capital was gone and the small
shareholders would lose all.
Entrepreneurs who organized and took large stakes in contemporary corporations faced two
options. They could keep the shares close and organize firms no larger than the capital contributed
by a small number of investors, all of whom had representation on the board and could thwart others'
efforts to self-deal. But concentrated ownership limited firm size and the organizers' ability to
diversify. Alternatively, to curtail the power of large shareholders corporate charters might limit the-4-
voting rights of large shareholders, which would increase the attractiveness of taking small ownership
stakes in corporations. With proportionately more votes than shares, minority shareholders might
elect some of their own to monitor and mitigate large shareholder self-dealing. Encouraging minority
shareholding reduced capital costs and allowed for greater portfolio diversification among large
shareholders. 
Nineteenth-century  corporations  adopted  various  strategies  designed  to  signal  their
willingness to reduce self-dealing and encourage minority ownership. Some strategies were imposed
by legislative fiat -- term limits on and regular rotation of directors; large boards with majority quora;
proxy  voting;  a  small  fraction  of  outstanding  shares  needed  to  call  extraordinary  shareholder
meetings; and limits on the number of votes that large shareholders might cast -- and others adopted
through corporate bylaws (Bodenhorn 2011). State corporation law was less readily changed,
however, and represented potentially stronger protections to minority shareholders. One of the more
important legislatively imposed strategies to curtail large shareholder self-dealing was limiting the
number of votes a large shareholder might cast at shareholder meetings.
Like Hilt (2008) and Musacchio (2009) this article investigates how differences in share
voting rules influenced the concentration of ownership. Unlike previous studies, which considered
differences in concentration across industries, this article investigates the effect of alternative voting
rules on share ownership in a single industry -- banking -- across time and space. Using a new data
set of shareholdings at about 700 banks from 14 states and five decades (1810s through 1860s), I
exploit state-level variation in corporate voting rights to identify the effect of alternative voting rules
on share ownership. Limits on the number of votes large shareholders could cast at shareholder
meetings were associated with more diffuse corporate ownership. As an example, Pennsylvania's-5-
corporate law circa 1815 imposed a 30-vote limit on large shareholders and banks there had, on
average, more than 800 shareholders. New York corporate law, alternatively, imposed one share-one
vote up to a maximum of 800 votes. On average, New York banks had fewer than 80 shareholders.
This finding is consistent with the observation that nineteenth-century bank regulators were
concerned, generally, with the concentration of corporate wealth and power, and, specifically, with
majority  shareholder  self-dealing  (Dunlavy  2006;  Bodenhorn  2011).  To  encourage  minority
ownership, which would limit concentration and the kind of self-dealing or looting that occurred at
the Canal Bank of Albany, legislatures limited the voting power of large shareholders. One share-one
vote regimes were less attractive to minority shareholders than voting rules that limited the number
of votes large shareholders might cast. The analysis below demonstrates that the association between
limited voting rights and less concentrated ownership is robust to how share concentration is
measured. Further, the formal statistical analysis, combined with contemporary expressions of
concerns  with  concentrated  ownership,  provides  strong  evidence  that  the  driving  corporate
governance issue of early nineteenth century was not the conflict of interest between managers and
owners; rather, the driving concern was the conflict of interest between majority and minority
shareholders. 
The second contribution of this article demonstrates why contemporary bank regulators were
so deeply concerned with bank governance. Because banks were not just another corporation in that
they supplied the bulk of the country's media of exchange, the conflict of interest surrounding
majority owner self-dealing through either looting or tunneling was not just that between large and
small share owners, but between large owners and creditors, namely depositors and holders of
banknotes.  Banks  are  different  (Fama  1980)  and  contemporaries  recognized  that  self-dealing-6-
threatened to disrupt financial markets and economic transactions. To test whether shareholding
concentration had any influence on bank risk taking, I regress share concentration measures on three
leverage ratios designed to capture liquidity (short-term) risk, default (medium-term) risk, and
bankruptcy (long-term) risk. The evidence shows that diffuse ownership was strongly negatively
associated with liquidity and bankruptcy risk, but it was positively associated with default risk. The
different tolerances for different kinds of risks are consistent with shareholder diversification and the
reason small shareholders held shares. In the wake of the recent financial crisis and concerns over
internal governance at banks, the historical evidence implies that limited voting rights of majority
shareholders may reduce certain behaviors that induce bank risk. Nineteenth-century evidence speaks
to the concern with majority shareholder looting and tunneling, but it does not speak to the separation
of ownership and control that so worried Berle and Means and how that conflict may influence
financial risk taking.
2. The politics of one share-one vote in early America
Some scholars too readily accept what Dunlavy (2004) considers the timeless view of the
corporation; that is, they write about the corporation as if it sprang forth in its modern incarnation
some time in the nineteenth century. It did not. One of its more important modern  governance
features -- "all shares vote, and all votes have the same weight" -- surely did not (Easterbrook and
Fischel 1983). One share-one vote did not emerge as the standard until the late nineteenth century
and then only after a long and contentious debate concerning the proper allocation of power within
the corporation. While modern corporate governance research is concerned primarily with vertical
power relations, or how owners treat with managers and how managers treat with employees,1 Despite La Porta et al.'s (1998) assertion of the primacy of the common law and the
origins of the modern corporation, judge-made law was of relatively minor import. The law of
corporation and the nature of internal governance originated and became standardized through
legislative enactments, not common law precedent (Harris 2009). In discussing much-cited Taylor
v. Griswold (14 N.J.L. 222 [NJ 1834]), which is often held up as a clear articulation of the
common law doctrine of one share-one vote, Ratner (1970) shows that the majority did not
reiterate an ancient common law tradition because there was no tradition to reiterate. Despite his
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nineteenth-century commentators were much more concerned with horizontal power relations, or
how owners treat with one another (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Share
voting rights reflected one manifestation of horizontal power relations within the firm. Voting rights
could be, and were, distributed along a continuum from pure democracy (one shareholder-one vote)
to pure plutocracy (one share-one vote), tending more toward the former than the latter (Ratner
1970; Maier 1993; Dunlavy 2004; Dunlavy 2006).
The issue of appropriate share voting rules dates from the very inception of the corporation.
In the earliest English corporations (circa 1500-1650), shareholders were considered members rather
than investors; charters were constitutions among equals (Maier 1993). One shareholder-one vote
was the logical byproduct of this conception of the corporation. Voting rights that increased less than
proportionately  with  residual  profit  rights  were  institutionalized  when  the  English  East  India
Company's charter became the governance prototype for the next century or more (Harris 2009). The
English East India Company's charter established a single class of shares, limited the number of votes
than any shareholder might cast, made all shareholders eligible to serve as directors, mandated that
all directors stand for annual (re)election, and provided for the removal of directors at any time for
nonperformance. 
As the so-called legal origins literature makes clear, English traditions traveled well and
influenced the institutions of corporate law in North America (La Porta et al. 1998).
1 The Bank ofassertion that the question was "perfectly plain," Justice Hornblower's opinion cited only a few
tangential common law precedents and a single legal treatise in support because there were few
precedent to cite in support or otherwise.
2 Transcripts of the debate are provided in Carey (1786). The debates and their meaning
are discussed in Maier (1993), Rappaport (1996), Dunlavy (2004) and Bodenhorn (2011).
3 Hamilton's Report on a National Bank and the charter of the Bank of the United States
are reprinted in Clark and Hall (1832). 
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North America was chartered by the Continental Congress in 1781. The bank's chartering act left
internal governance rules to the organizers. Contrary to English custom, Robert Morris and the bank's
other principals adopted a one share-one vote rule (Rappaport 1996; Bodenhorn 2011). Their choice
quickly came under attack by men with no direct stake in the bank, an attack that led to an annulment
of the bank's charter. After a heated legislative debate the Bank of North America's charter was
restored, but to assuage critics the bank's bylaws were revised to limit the number of votes any
shareholder could cast.
2
As a friend of Morris and an astute observer of contemporary finance, Alexander Hamilton
was familiar with the Bank of North America debates and his Report on a National Bank and the
chartering  bill  for  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  attempted  to  allay  Republican  distaste  for
undemocratic corporations by offering a middle ground to share voting (Dunlavy 2004; Bodenhorn
2011).
3 In the Report Hamilton rejected the federal government's use of the Bank of North America
as the national bank for several reasons, not least of which was its one share-one vote rule, which
he considered unwise. He considered the one shareholder-one vote rule "not less erroneous" (Clarke
and Hall 1832, 28). Hamilton developed an alternative, graduated voting rule he labeled the prudent
mean and described it thus:
For one share, and not more than two shares, one vote; for every two shares above two, and-9-
not exceeding ten, one vote; for every four shares above ten, and not exceeding thirty, one
vote; for every six shares above thirty, and not exceeding sixty, one vote; for every eight
shares above sixty, and not exceeding one hundred, one vote; and for every ten shares above
one hundred, one vote; but no person, co-partnership, or body politic, shall be entitled to a
greater number than thirty votes (Clarke and Hall 1832, 32).
Although the Bank of the United States charter resembled the Bank of England charter in several
respects, its voting rule looked more like that adopted by the English East India Company. Larger
shareholdings received more votes, but votes did not increase linearly in shares and the charter
imposed a ceiling on the number of votes that might be cast by any one shareholder. Hamilton had
previously included a similar voting scheme in the Bank of New York's 1784 articles of association,
so it was issue he had been thinking about for some time (Dommett 1884; Hammond 1957).
Hamilton’s prudent mean (hereafter labeled graduated voting) rule proved popular and
durable. By the 1840s variations on his graduated voting rule appeared in bank charters from Maine
to Georgia, and from Virginia to Missouri. Whereas the Bank of the United States’s charter limited
a shareholder owning 25 shares to nine votes, New Jersey bank shareholders who owned 25 shares
could cast eight votes at shareholder meetings. Bank shareholders in New Hampshire with 25 shares
could cast 10 votes; in Missouri they could cast either 12 or 13; in Massachusetts 10; in Georgia just
6. In 1811 New York adopted the first general incorporation law (manufacturers only), which
specified one share-one vote. One share-one vote had become standard language in New York bank
charters by 1830 but, at that time, one share-one vote was more the exception than the rule. Only
Delaware, Georgia and Illinois followed suit. By 1860, one share-one vote rules were also adopted
in Ohio, Indiana and Wisconsin. Connecticut remained an anomaly in that voting rules written into
the banks' charters reflected the organizers’ wishes; eight of Connecticut’s first ten banks adopted one4 In the empirical analysis to follow, New York is treated as a one share-one vote regime
because, with the exception of three New York City banks,  the 400- and 800-share limits were
not found to be binding.
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share-one vote rules; the two remaining adopted different graduated voting rules. More importantly,
voting rules once adopted persisted. In Pennsylvania graduated voting rules lasted until 1874; in
Massachusetts such rules persisted until 1906 for railroads, 1910 for banks and 1928 for insurance
companies (Ratner 1970, 7). 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of five voting rights regimes, four of which are
variants on Hamilton’s graduated voting rule. By the mid-1820s any newly chartered bank in New
York operated under a one share-one vote rule with a maximum of either 400 or 800 votes depending
on the number of shares outstanding.
4 Graduated voting rules in the four other states all fall well
below the 45-degree line because the voting rights of large shareholders were limited. Kentucky, for
example, instituted one share-one vote up to a maximum of 50 votes, then one additional vote for
every additional five shares up to 100 shares, and then one vote for every ten shares above 100.
Maryland had one share-one vote up to a maximum of 20 shares, then one additional vote for each
five additional shares. Rhode Island adopted a graduated voting rule up to 50 shares with a maximum
of 20 votes; Massachusetts (not shown) imposed a 10 vote limit. The schemes presented in Figure
1 are not exhaustive, just illustrative of the many variations on Hamilton’s graduated voting rule. It
demonstrates that during the first half of the nineteenth century, Americans did not generally embrace
one share-one vote rules. Although corporate charters created a single class of shares (preferred
shares emerge only later) with equal residual claims, shares carried potentially unequal voting rights
and, therefore, unequal control rights.5 The literature begins with Berle and Means (1932/1968) and includes Manne (1965),
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983), Easterbrook and Fischel (1983), Grossman
and Hart (1988), Roe (1994), Law Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000), among many
others. Concise summaries of the current state of theory and evidence are provided in Burkhart
and Lee (2008) and Adams and Fereira (2008). 
6 This assumes, of course, that debt intermediation drives a wedge between borrowing and
lending rates. See Myers (1977) for a discussion of corporate borrowing. 
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3. The economics of share voting
The economics of corporate governance and share voting is now so well understood that I
offer a brief discussion of two relevant conceptual issues and how they apply to nineteenth-century
corporations.
5 First, corporate shareholders are subject to collective actions problems. Because the
benefits of monitoring managers are diffuse and the costs concentrated, shareholders produce
inefficiently low levels of monitoring. As a consequence, managers may not face effective internal
discipline. The market for shares and regular dividends provide imperfect substitutes, as do debt
contracts that encourage creditor monitoring (Hart 2001). Outside the few city banks whose shares
traded regularly, shareholder exit (or the threat of takeover) was probably not a fully effective
disciplining device in the nineteenth century. Dividends reduce the cash available for managers to
consume as perquisites, which forces managers into debt markets. Although some debt enhances
shareholder governance, its excessive use will sufficiently reduce free cash flow that the relatively
more costly option of debt finance may render unprofitable entrepreneurial ventures that would be
profitable if financed with retained earnings.
6 Many nineteenth-century bank charters limited the
amount that banks could accumulate in retained earnings accounts, forcing them to distribute profits.
Distributing profits limits looting and tunneling, but an excessive reliance on debt may cause too many
bankruptcies and the liquidation of otherwise good firms.7 Several scholars identify an association between higher proportions of shares owned and
lower firm values and attribute it to expropriation (Becht, Bolton and Röell 2003 provide an
overview). If minority shareholders are rational and expect majority shareholders to tunnel or loot
at their expense, the prices they are willing to pay for their few shares reflect their individuals
assessments of the likelihood and extent of expropriation. If minority shareholders anticipate self-
dealing, the rents from majority shareholder self-dealing will be offset by the reduced market value
of the shares owned and the post-expropriation returns to minority shareholders will be
competitive. True expropriation then turns on information asymmetries between large and small
shareholders.
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Second, one solution to the collective action problem of diffuse ownership is the presence of
one or a few large shareholders. Because residual claims on the corporation’s earnings are tied to
residual control rights associated with voting, a shareholder with a substantial fraction of his or her
wealth tied up in a firm has an incentive to elect and monitor managers committed to maximizing the
value of the firm to the large shareholder (Easterbrook and Fischel 1983; Shleifer and Vishny 1986).
And, in the modern context, at least, large shareholders – those holding at least 5% of the outstanding
shares – are more prevalent than might be expected. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) report that 45% of
Fortune 500 companies had at least one 5% shareholder. 
But large shareholdings are not without their own incentive problems. Although a few large
shareholders face incentives to control the excessive consumption of managerial perks, they also face
incentives to elect board members and hire managers willing to direct the firm’s resources to the large
shareholders’s advantage, perhaps at the expense of minority shareholders. Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny (1988), in fact, identify an inverted U-shaped relationship between the largest ownership stake
and Tobin’s Q. For firms with the largest single shareholding between 0 and 5%, they find a positive
relationship between the largest ownership stake and firm value. Ownership stakes beyond 5% are
associated with lower Q values. They attribute this to large shareholders expropriating from small
shareholders, a pattern of self-dealing they label tunneling.
7 But, as in the Canal Bank case, large8 Modern corporate finance is more concerned with the current trend toward providing
some shares with more than proportionate voting rights, which further entrenches the power of
large shareholders. The analyses of more votes than shares and fewer votes than shares are not
symmetric, but Burkhart and Lee (2008) provide a brief review of the consequences of fewer
votes than shares.
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shareholder self-dealing might be nothing less than looting. 
Although one share-one vote is equitable, it may or may not be efficient (Easterbrook and
Fischel 1983). If we let Q represent firm value, v votes, and s shares, Burkhart and Lee (2008) show
that Q increases as (v-s) decreases.
8 A one share-one vote rule translates into higher firm value for
shareholders. They note, however, that expropriation declines as (v-s) approaches -s. Expropriation
is minimized when the majority shareholder owns a large block of non-voting shares: he monitors but
cannot expropriate. Although expropriation would be minimized and the incentives for majority
shareholders to monitor are enhanced under such a voting rule, limits on the influence of large
shareholders dilutes the shareholders’ abilities to concentrate and exercise control over managers.
Limits on share voting – including any variation on Hamilton’s graduated voting rights rule –
introduce a tradeoff between managerial self-dealing and majority shareholder self-dealing. 
That so many states included graduated voting rules in corporate charters suggests that
nineteenth-century shareholders were less concerned with managerial than majority shareholder self-
dealing. This is not surprising given that contemporary corporations did not employ the extensive
managerial hierarchies that emerged later in the century. The typical bank employed a cashier (chief
operating officer), a few tellers and a staff of clerks to record daily transactions. Best practice
recommended separate clerks for each of the major account books – loans, banknotes, deposits, cash
– to mitigate opportunities for fraud, but this still implies that a typical bank employed a half-dozen
men; the largest city banks perhaps a couple dozen, only a handful of whom exercised much9 Lamoreaux (1994) argues that the benefits of insider self-dealing at nineteenth-century
New England banks (overcoming information asymmetries over loan quality) outweighed the
costs (accepting too many bad loans).
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managerial discretion.
Lending choices, perhaps the most important management decision at banks, were delegated
by charter or bylaws to discount committees, which were usually populated by three to seven
members of the board. Prospective borrowers applied at the bank and the discount committee would
offer recommendations on whether to accept each loan at a weekly or biweekly meetings. Given the
internal operating structure, managerial self-dealing was limited so long as the board and the discount
committee did their jobs. A prominent concern with the discount committee procedure, however, was
that it provided opportunities for large shareholder self-dealing. With more voting shares, large
shareholders could elect themselves to boards and then onto discount committees that might too
willingly accept each others’ loans.
9 Meissner (2005) finds a positive association between discount
committee  size  and  profitability  that  he  attributes  to  larger  boards  providing  more  effective
monitoring and the reduced incidence of unprofitable insider self-dealing.
From the standpoint of the small shareholder, banks with larger boards, larger discount
committees and fewer large shareholders would have presented more attractive investments. That is,
small  shareholders  could  better  protect  themselves  from  expropriation  by  self-dealing  large
shareholders with graduated voting rule or maximum vote limits or a combination of the two.
Contemporaries certainly expressed great concern over the possibilities for one share-one vote
regimes to generate tunneling, looting or other forms of self-dealing. In his Report on a National
Bank, Hamilton advocated a graduated voting rule because one shareholder-one vote failed to give
more weight to men more invested in the firm, but one share-one vote rendered “a combination-15-
between a few principal stockholders, to monopolize the power and benefits of the bank, too easy”
(Clarke and Hall 1832, 28). Hamilton’s assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Tench Coxe, declared that
the one blemish on the Bank of North America’s charter was it one share-one vote rule because it led
to “conspiracy” within the bank, by which he meant institutionalized self-dealing among a few large
shareholders (Dorfman 1946, 291). Two empirical questions are presented by contemporary debates
and practices: (1) did graduated voting rules lead to more diffuse ownership than one share-one vote
rule?, and, (2) did diffuse ownership lead to more or less risk taking at nineteenth-century banks?
After discussing the data, subsequent sections bring some new evidence to bear on these questions.
4. Data
Information on shareholding for nineteenth-century US banks is not readily available, but it
can be found in bank histories, scattered legislative reports, extant bank ledgers at various archives
and other contemporary documents. Bank histories tend to provide lists of the founding shareholders
(Dommett 1884; Gras 1938; Baldwin 1916). If the sample consisted only of such data, it would be
subject to survivor bias, but data from these sources represent a modest fraction of the total number
of observations (5 of 711) used here. 
A second data source are of original subscribers. Such lists are less subject to survivor bias --
many of the banks' lists used here, in fact, failed -- but these are subject to a different kind of bias.
Lists of original shareholders may not represent equilibrium investor holdings. Then, as now, new
share issues were subject to initial public offering pricing effects as speculators scrambled to capture
quick profits in the price run-ups that surrounded new offerings. Cowen (2000, 35) describes the
subscription "frenzy" surrounding the First Bank of the United States in July 1791. The initial public-16-
offering was over-subscribed by 20 percent. At the IPO date, subscribers to each $400 share paid $25
in cash and received transferable scrip that entitled the bearer to purchase a share. Buyers of the scrip
were purchasing an option right to pay an additional $375 in four additional semi-annual instalments.
Once the full $400 has been tendered the scrip would be redeemed for a share. By early August 1791,
$25 scrip prices rose as high as $250. An investor buying scrip at this price was effectively paying
close to $625 (undiscounted present value) for a $400 share. Prices for the $25 scrip declined from
the peak, but remained between $130 and $170 for the remainder of the year. Speculations in state
bank shares around their initial public offerings differed only in magnitude. The only subscriber lists
used here are for the 33 Pennsylvania banks chartered en masse in 1817 and about 20 banks newly
chartered in New York in 1829 and 1830, so these, too, represent less than 10 percent of overall
sample.
A third source of data, subject to yet a different kind of bias, is shareholder lists compiled by
legislative committees during hearings following a bank's failure. As with subscriber lists, it is not
clear whether shareholding at failure represented equilibrium ownership. If informed insiders sold out
in the weeks and months prior to failure, shareholdings would reflect information asymmetries
between insiders and outsiders more than typical holdings. The data set includes only three such banks
from New York: the Canal Bank of Albany, the Lewis County Bank and the Eighth Avenue Bank of
New York City, all of which failed between 1848 and 1854. Reports tendered by trustees appointed
to resolve the bankruptcies do not write about insiders selling out prior to the failures, so the lists are
included here. Some bank resolution reports that indicated unusual share trading prior to bankruptcy
were not used.
A fourth source of data is state legislative reports published following a general banking panic.10 The data appendix provides the sources details and Appendix Table A1 provides
information on the number of observations by state and decade. Massachusetts, Maine, New
Hampshire, New York and Wisconsin provide most of the data. And while the 1830s are
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Michigan, for example, collected shareholder lists in 1840 and 1841 after the crisis of 1839 and the
suspension of specie payments. Ohio collected shareholder lists in 1854 following a localized panic
in that state (Van Horn 2011). Interestingly, to determine how shareholdings had changed, the
legislature collected and published lists of shareholders in 1849 and 1854. It is not clear how a panic
might influence shareholding. If the panic was of the sunspot type described in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), it is unlikely that existing shareholders would sell out in anticipation of the event so that pre-
panic and post-panic shareholder lists should provide fairly representative shareholding. The Ohio
lists, in fact, reveal relatively modest turnover in the five-year interval between 1849 and 1854.
The  fifth  and  most  useful  sources  are  legislative  documents  that  report  shareholder
information for all banks at a point in time. Among the data used here, Massachusetts, Maine, New
Hampshire and Wisconsin all required some type of shareholder information on an annual basis.
Maine published annual shareholder lists for all incorporated business firms (not just banks) chartered
by the state. Data from four years (1840, 1843, 1845 and 1849) of reports that could be located are
used here. Following passage of their free banking acts, New York and Wisconsin collected and
published information on individual shareholdings at some (New York) or most (Wisconsin) of those
state's free banks. Massachusetts published information only on the number of shares held by the
single largest shareholder and New Hampshire, with a few exceptions, published information only on
the total number of shareholders. These types of information are less informative than lists of
individual shareholdings, but they do provide information about the concentration of share ownership
and are used here.
10 relatively well represented, most of the available data was collected between 1840 and 1862, with
the greatest number of observations coming from the 1850s. 
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Several shareholder concentration measures are constructed from the available data and are
reported in Table 1. Hilt (2008) focuses on the number of shareholders and its natural log. It is
evident from the table that banks operating in one share-one vote regimes had significantly fewer
shareholders than graduated voting banks. The mean number of shareholders in one share-one vote
states was 38 compared to 149 in graduated voting rule states. Figure 2 presents shareholder
distributions in Maine and New York, two representative states with a large number of observations.
The figure suggests that differences in mean shareholdings was not the consequence of outliers. The
largest class of shareholdings in Maine (graduated voting) was those holding 10 or fewer shares. In
New York, the largest class of shareholdings (one share-one vote) was those holding between 11 and
20 shares, but the proportion of shareholdings in consecutively larger classes are notably larger than
in Maine, remarkably so in the class of shareholdings between 91 and 100 shares. These are relatively
close corporations by modern standards, but bank shares were more widely held than any other type
of corporate share in this period (Hilt 2008; Majewski 2006). 
Alternatively, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use the fraction of shares owned by the five largest
and twenty largest shareholders, as well as the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI), to capture
shareholder concentration. Those measures are also reported in Table 1, along with the fraction of
shares owned by the single largest shareholder (in order to utilize the limited information included in
the  Massachusetts  banks  reports).  All  three  measures  reveal  substantially  more  concentrated
ownership at banks in one share-one vote states than banks in graduated voting states. Across the
entire sample, the single largest shareholder accounts for 21 percent of outstanding shares, but th-19-
largest shareholder accounts for 36 percent of outstanding shares at one share-one vote banks
compared to just 10 percent at graduated voting banks. An advantage of the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index is that it accounts for share holdings over the entire distribution and it too reveals markedly
different  share  ownership  patterns  at  the  two  types  of  banks.  As  a  final  measure  of  share
concentration, Table 1 reports the fraction of banks at which a group of five or fewer shareholders
controlled at least 20 percent of the outstanding shares. La Porta et al. (1998) believe that this to be
the important measure in matters of corporate governance because a 20 percent stake is generally
sufficient to take effective control of the board and, therefore, the corporation. A small control group
may be more likely to engage in self-dealing. While the majority of banks were controlled by small
groups (not including family groups), the difference between one share-one vote and graduated voting
states remains.
5. Voting rules, share concentration and leverage
The remainder of the article investigates two related questions. First, did alternative voting
rules systematically influence the concentration of share ownership controlling for other features of
the environment? Second, did the concentration of share ownership systematically alter banking
practice? The results answer each question in the affirmative. Subsequent sections provide the details
of the analysis.
5.1 Voting rules and share concentration
The first step in the empirical analysis considers the whether and the extent to which
alternative voting rights influenced the concentration of share ownership. Hilt (2008, 669) contends-20-
that corporate ownership structure and voting rules were jointly endogenous when looking across
industries within a single state. Manufacturers in 1820s New York had the most concentrated
ownership and were the least likely to have adopted graduated voting rules. Banks, on the other hand,
exhibited the least concentrated ownership and were the most likely to have adopted graduated voting
rules. Interstate analysis is less subject to endogeneity, however. As discussed above, once a state
established a particular voting rule it was slow to change. Still, there might be concerns that the
choice of voting rule was not random and responded to some economic or political features of the
states. Although it does not exhaust the list of possible influences, linear probability models of voting
rules (circa 1830) revealed no systematical correlation with population, the percent of the population
enslaved, the percent employed in manufacturing in 1820, the percent of popular vote of the number
of electoral college votes for Andrew Jackson in 1828, or bank capital per capita in 1820 or 1830.
Voting rules were exogenous to readily observable state political and economic features.
Even if voting rules were exogenous across states, it is possible that shareholders sorted
across regimes. That is, a potential shareholder residing in a one share-one vote state that was
concerned with majority shareholder self-dealing may have invested across state lines in a graduated
voting rule states. Similarly, investors residing in a graduated voting rule states with a preference for
one share-one vote may have invested elsewhere. Although some easterners invested in western
banks, the limited extant evidence suggests that New Yorkers (one share-one vote) investors were
more likely than easterners in graduated voting rules states (Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania) to invest in banks in Ohio and Wisconsin (one share-one vote). Whether this was an
expression of preference for a familiar voting rule or the consequence that New York was the largest
investment market in the late antebellum era is unclear. What is unambiguously clear, is that most-21-
owners were locals, which is not surprising given information asymmetries and the value of local
knowledge. 
Accepting voting rights as exogenous from the perspective of the individual investor, yields
the following general estimating equation:
(1)  Share concentrationit = ￿ + ￿ Voting Rightsit + ￿ Xit + ￿it
where Xit represents a vector of bank-specific controls, including the bank's age, its capitalization,
whether is was a free bank, and the (natural log) population of the city or town in which it was
located. Bank age (in years) is likely to influence share ownership because shares change hands and
may become either more concentrated or diffuse over time, depending on the rules underlying the
distribution of shares at the initial public offering. Helwege et al (2007) argue that most modern firms
begin with relatively concentrated share holdings that grow more diffuse over time. It is unclear a
priori whether the same will be true in the nineteenth century.  Some states encouraged diffuse
holdings by limiting the number of shares a single individual might subscribe to; other states included
no such restrictions. In the former case, we might expect a movement toward concentration; in the
latter a movement toward diffuseness. The larger the bank's capital, the more shares, so perhaps the
more diffuse was ownership. A free bank variable is included to capture any free banking effect
independent of bank capitalization and age. Free banks are younger and smaller, on average, than
chartered banks, but there may remain a free banking effect independent of age and size. Finally, city
or town population is included to capture the potential size of the market for shares. Shares could be
and were sometimes geographically diffuse -- the Bank of Kentucky, for example, sold many of its
shares through Philadelphia brokers and its shares traded irregularly on the Philadelphia exchange --
but most founding bankers viewed the local market as the most important source of investment-22-
capital. Larger markets were more attractive than smaller ones, all else equal. Moreover, given the
opacity and idiosyncracy of bank portfolios, investor proximity was likely to be of value. Standard
errors of the estimated coefficients are corrected for clustering at the city level. This allows the
clusters to capture common error processes while allowing the number of clusters to be large enough
for the technique to be effective (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2005). 
Estimated coefficients on the control variables are generally statistically significant and the
direction of influence is consistent with expectations. Shareholding was more diffuse at larger banks
located in larger cities and towns. Contrary to modern studies, however, older banks exhibit more
concentrated ownership, all else equal. A one standard deviation increase in bank age (11.7 years)
decreased the number of shareholders by about 20 percent; it increased the fraction of shares held by
the five largest shareholders by nearly 5 percent, and the probability that a small group would control
20  percent  or  more  of  the  bank's  shares  by  19.9  percent.  Increasing  concentration  was  the
consequence of contemporary IPO rules. Some states limited the number of shares any individual (or
partnership or corporation) might subscribe to, but even when no such rule was imposed, laws
typically required shares to be distributed pro rata with the subscription when initial public offerings
were oversubscribed. Moreover, every subscriber was guaranteed at least one share. Thus, if an
individual subscribed for 100 of a bank's 2000 shares, but subscriptions totaled 3000 shares, the 100-
share subscriber received no more than two-thirds of his subscription, or 66 instead of 100 shares.
All other subscribers' allocations were similarly reduced. If the investor preferred a five percent stake
in the bank (100 shares), he could purchase shares from other subscribers, but only after the IPO was11 After the subscription frenzy at the Bank of the United States in 1791, most bank
charters included a provision against the sale of one's subscription until the shares were fully paid.
Subscribers usually had to swear that they were the bona fide purchasers and had not sold their
claim to someone else. The rule served three purposes: to limit speculation; to create transparency
in ownership so that a consortium of subscribers could not disguise their control of the bank at the
IPO; and, to spread corporate ownership as widely as possible.
-23-
complete.
11 With thin secondary markets outside Boston, New York and Philadelphia, consolidating
a large position in a bank took some time. 
The coefficients of principal interest are those on the graduated voting variable. Regardless
of the measure of shareholder concentration used as the dependent variable, graduated voting rights
rules are associated with more diffuse ownership. Graduated voting rules increased the number of
shareholders by an estimated 164 percent (e
0.97 - 1), a value consistent with, though smaller than the
397 percent ratio of the raw means reported in Table 1. Graduated voting rules are also associated
with more diffuse share holding, whether measured by the Single Largest, Five Largest, Twenty
Largest or the Herfindahl-Hirshmann Index (HHI). The single largest shareholder in the average
graduated voting bank owned 10.3 percent less shares than the single largest shareholder in the
average one share-one vote bank. Similarly, the HHI for the representative bank in a graduated voting
rule state was 193 percent lower than that for the representative one share-one vote bank. 
Following  La  Porta  et  al  (1998),  who  argue  that  large  block  ownership  rather  than
concentration per se is strongly associated with the quality of governance, Table 2 also reports the
results of regressions where the dependent variable equals 1 if (1) the single largest share holding
controls at least 20% of the stock (Single Control), or, (2) the five largest shareholdings represent
at least 20% of the outstanding shares (Large Block). Single Control captures the influence of a
controlling shareholder, a feature that troubled some contemporary observers. There are at least two12 One practical advantage of the measure is that allows for use of the Massachusetts data,
which reported only the single largest share holding.
-24-
disadvantages of the Single Control measure.
12 First, the mechanics of lending discussed earlier
suggests that large shareholder self-dealing might be dependent on taking control of the discount
committee, which would require a majority of a three to seven-member committee. Second, it is
unlikely to capture the influence of family block holdings that are not readily discernible in many of
the bank reports, but were a common feature of nineteenth corporate ownership. The Large Block
variable is designed to capture the effect of blocks of family–owned shares or other interlocked
groups that are not apparent in the shareholder lists. The last two columns of Table 2 report the
results of linear probability model (probit estimates were not substantially different) with either the
Single Control or the Large Block variable as the dependent variable. Bank operating under a
graduated voting rule regime were 27 percent less likely to have a single controlling shareholder and
nearly 29 percent less likely to have a group of controlling shareholders.
Interstate evidence from the financial sector stand in sharp contrast to Hilt’s (2008, 671)
findings. Using an alternative measure of voting rights and considering New York corporations in
several sectors, he concluded that graduated “voting rights schemes did not cause the distribution of
shares to become dramatically more equal.... Evidently, investors were willing to hold stakes that
were large enough to be penalized by graduated voting rights schemes.” In fairness, Hilt notes that
his regressions do not reveal causal relationships because voting  rights  rules were potentially
endogenous in some industries in New York in the 1820s. In contrast, interstate variation in voting
rights at banks were arguably exogenous (outside Connecticut at least). Voting rights regimes are not
predictable from readily observable state-level economic, financial or political variables. Once a-25-
regime was selected, it tended to persist and nearly every bank in a state operated under one regime
or another. The  interstate evidence provides compelling evidence that alternative voting rules
influenced the diffusion of share holdings. Banks in states that limited the voting rights of large
shareholders exhibited more diffuse ownership, which suggests that at least some shareholders were
concerned with tunneling, looting and other forms of self-dealing by majority shareholders.
5.2 Share concentration and leverage
While evidence concerning the relationship between corporate voting rights and the balance
of power between large and small shareholders is interesting in its own right, a second important issue
is whether and to what extent the balance of power manifested itself in firm performance. If leverage
and riskiness are correlated at financial firms, if bank risk taking is privately and socially costly, and
risk tolerances differ across stakeholders, leverage ratios provide valuable metrics of bank risk-taking
preferences.
Any discussion of bank leverage and portfolio risk must acknowledge potential conflicts
between  five  distinct  groups:  creditors,  managers,  regulators,  large  shareholders,  and  small
shareholders. It is widely accepted that limited liability shareholders have incentives to increase firm
risk taking by increasing leverage (Saunders et al 1990). To the extent that depositors and other bank
creditors can only imperfectly monitor bank portfolios, bank owners can increase the value of their
equity by increasing the underlying riskiness of the bank’s portfolio at the expense of the firm’s
creditors. The owners’ ability to increase leverage depends on the effectiveness of regulators and the
risk preferences of managers. Owners and managers generally have different risk tolerances (Rose-
Ackerman 1991). Because managers have invested in nondiversifiable, firm-specific human capital,-26-
they will pass up risky loans preferred by the well-diversified shareholder. Saunders et al (1990), in
fact, find that owner-controlled banks exhibit greater risk taking than manager-controlled banks.
It is not obvious how leverage changes with large shareholdings absent information on the
diversification of large and small shareholders. If large shareholdings represent an effort on the part
of a well-diversified investor to increase the idiosyncratic component of firm value through leverage,
the presence of a large shareholder may increase bank risk taking because variance is valuable. If, on
the other hand, the large shareholder has a substantial share of his or her total wealth tied up in a
single firm, high leverage exposes him or her to greater risks of substantial loss than a more
diversified investor. If the undiversified large shareholder controls the firm’s strategic decisions, he
may pass up some profitable opportunities to lever based on an assessment of total rather than
idiosyncratic risk (Güner and Aydo￿an 2002). 
Three leverage ratios are considered here. First, the ratio of banknotes to total liabilities.
Bank-issued debt serves as currency and creates an atypical class of corporate creditors who can
exercise a redemption option at will (Calomiris and Kahn 1991). Bank-issued debt also affords
opportunities for controlling shareholders to expropriate from creditors and minority shareholders.
In a brief period, controlling shareholders could issue additional debt (principally banknotes) to secure
more of the firm’s resources for their own use through poorly secured or otherwise risky loans that
informed creditors or minority shareholders would not approve. In short, control of the ability to issue
short-term debt affords the controlling shareholder additional opportunities for self-dealing even while
it increases the likelihood of financial distress. 
A second measure of leverage is the loan-asset ratio, which should reflect risk tolerances.
Banks could construct portfolios of the same overall risk by holding a portfolio of low-risk loans and-27-
a few relatively risk-free government bonds or a portfolio of risky loans and more bonds. If a well-
diversified large shareholder preferred idiosyncratic variance, however, and returns on risky loans
were greater than bonds, large shareholders would prefer a higher loan-asset ratio. In the alternative,
Lamoreaux (1994) found that share ownership was valued not just for its value as an investment, but
for the access it afforded to bank loans. Many nineteenth-century banks were insider operations in
that shareholders had an implicit prior claim on a bank’s lending. Thus, small shareholders may have
bought shares to exercise this right and regular demands from shareholder/borrowers may have
limited a bank’s ability to reduce risk through portfolio diversification. 
Third, the asset-capital ratio is used as a measure bankruptcy risk. Higher asset-capital ratios
(or greater capital leverage) meant that risky banks were less able to absorb losses and were more
prone to bankruptcy, whether due to systemic or idiosyncratic shocks. The three leverage measures
are designed to capture short-term (liquidity) risks, medium term (default risk), and long-term
(bankruptcy risk). 
The empirical issue is whether voting rules influenced bank leverage. If it did, was the
influence of alternative voting rules mediated through its effect on shareholder concentration? The
second question is particularly relevant considering the earlier discussion of majority shareholder self-
dealing.  Jensen  (1986)  contends  that  debt  limits  expropriation  through  third-party  (creditor)
monitoring, but debt took an uncharacteristic form at banks in  that creditors exercised their claims
on a first come-first serve rule (Calomiris and Khan 1991). But Faccio et al (2003) find that greater
control  by  a  large  shareholder  is  associated  with  greater  leverage.  Their  finding  implies  that
controlling shareholders use leverage to channel the firm’s resources to their own uses. If nineteenth-
century majority shareholders used banks to finance their nonbanking ventures, they would prefer-28-
greater  leverage  than  minority  shareholders.  Legislative  inquiries  into  failed  banks  uncovered
extremely high leverage and shareholders who had taken control of the board and become the bank’s
largest debtors. Such sources are subject to selection, of course, given the absence of comparable
inquiries into nonfailed banks, but the pattern suggests greater leverage (and risk-taking) at banks
with more concentrated ownership. An empirical concern is that, for an exogenously given voting
rule, share concentration and leverage are likely to be jointly endogenous. The concern can be
mitigated through the use of instrumental variables (IV) regression.
To determine whether and to what extent alternative voting rules influenced bank behavior,
I adopt the following empirical specification:
(1)  Share concentrationit = ￿ + ￿ Voting Rightsit + ￿ Xit + ￿it
(2)  Leverageit = ￿ Share concentrationit + ￿Wit + ￿it
where the estimation involves specifying Equation (1) as the first-stage and Equation (2) as the
second-stage regression. For the procedure to generate consistent estimates, the proposed instrument
has to satisfy several conditions. First, it must be exogenous. The discussion above makes a strong
case for the exogeneity of voting rules, at least from the perspective of the local investor. Second,
the instrument must induce meaningful variation in the share concentration, The evidence presented
in §5.1 above shows that it does. Third, the instrument must affect bank leverage outcomes through
concentration and not some other channel. Two plausible alternative channels presented themselves:
the par value of shares (low share denominations might be more attractive to small shareholders) and
total bank capitalization (more shares leads to more diffuse ownership). Preliminary tests (not
reported) using these variables as instruments showed no evidence of these alternative pathways-29-
influencing leverage through concentration. Finally, bank shareholders must not self-select into
alternative voting rights regimes. The limited available evidence, discussed above, suggests that most
investors were local and it seems implausible that potential investors would relocate in response to
corporate voting regimes. It is also implausible that differential labor market conditions that might
induce mobility would be systematically related to voting regimes.
The results of 42 separate regressions are summarized in Table 3. Each principle cell in the
table reports either the OLS coefficient or the IV coefficient from regressions of the general form
reported in equations (1) and (2) above. Five notable features merit discussion. First, the Davidson-
McKinnon test statistic shows that the IV estimates are consistent (the test statistics systematically
reject the null that OLS estimates are consistent). Second, the IV estimates are substantially larger
than the OLS estimates, sometimes five times as great. Given the nature of the IV estimation strategy,
this is not unexpected. The IV coefficients reflect the local average treatment effect (LATE), which
applies to banks that adopted graduated voting rules because they operated in a graduated voting rule
state but which would otherwise have adopted a one share-one vote rule. This excludes graduated
voting rule volunteers and includes only banks for which graduated voting rules were binding. Given
the popularity of graduated voting rules in the early to mid-nineteenth century, the LATE effect is
likely to have affected a select group of banks. Because Connecticut did not officially adopt either
regime, allowing bank organizers to select, it provides some insight into how often a voting rule may
have been binding. Of a sample of 40 Connecticut banks chartered between 1790 and 1840, only four
adopted a true Hamilton-style graduated voting rule (votes increasing less than linearly in shares), but
an additional 19 banks included vote ceilings, or limits on the maximum number of votes that might
be cast by large shareholders. Moreover, the ceilings (generally between 15 and 75 votes) were-30-
binding  if  share  holdings  in  Connecticut  were  similar  to  those  in  the  neighboring  states  of
Massachusetts and New York. That more than half of banks free to adopt one share-one vote rules
chose some type of graduated voting rule instead suggests that the LATE estimates reported in Table
3 represent meaningful effects. That is, there were a not insubstantial number of banks for which the
rule was binding.
Third, greater share concentration was associated with a greater reliance on funding asset
purchases through banknotes than deposits, even after controlling for free banking (which was a more
banknote reliant system than chartered banking). A one standard deviation increase in the (log)
number of shareholders, for example, is associated with a 20.5% decrease in the Banknote-Liability
ratio. The coefficients on the other measures of concentration suggest that the presence of one or
more large shareholders, or more concentrated ownership generally, was associated with significant
increases in the use of banknotes to finance a bank’s portfolio. When a single shareholder (Single
Control) held 20 percent or more of a bank’s shares, its Banknote-Liability ratio increased by nearly
47 percent. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of shares owned by the Single
Largest shareholder increased the banknote ratio by 29.6 percent. 
The banknote-liability ratio mattered to stakeholders other than large shareholders for a
number of reasons. An increased reliance on banknotes relative to other funding sources, especially
deposits,  increased  the  risk  of  a  bank  run  and  the  suspension  of  specie  payments.  It  was  a
commonplace in the nineteenth century that good banking was synonymous with limited use of
banknotes (Hammond 1957, 188-190). Although markets in banknotes emerged that mitigated
information asymmetries between note holder and banker, note holders tended to be more dispersed
and less well-informed than depositors (Gorton 1996). Of greater concern to the small shareholder-31-
was the possibility that a controlling shareholder could, at nearly any time, print additional banknotes,
buy up assets and abscond, leaving the small shareholders liable for the losses. Wildcatting was just
one, admittedly rare, instance of such fraudulent behavior, but less-conspicuous cases of tunneling
were surely an ongoing concern.
Fourth, there is a robust negative association between share concentration and loan-asset
ratios. A one standard deviation increase in the (log) number of shareholders is associated with an
18.1 percent increase in the ratio. All the concentration measures, on the other hand, imply that
greater concentration of share ownership led to lower ratios. When a single shareholder owned 20
percent or more of a bank’s shares, the loan-asset ratio declined by 11.1 percent. A one standard
deviation increase in the fraction of shares controlled by the single largest shareholder reduced the
ratio by 21.9 percent. 
The loan-asset ratio reflects a bank’s medium-term default risk in that it could trade off risk
and return through its composition of safe government bonds and risky loans. The mechanism driving
the negative association between share concentration and loan-asset ratios is likely that identified by
Lamoreaux  (1994).  Shareholding  provided  access  to  bank  lending.  Discount  committees
systematically favored insiders (owners) over outsiders and there are reported instances of insiders
completely monopolizing a bank’s lending (Wainwright 1953). The clamor for bank charters, at times,
was driven by the exclusion of outsiders from credit. With more owners, discount committees likely
faced greater demands from insiders and, consequently, there were fewer opportunities to diversify
into non-loan earning assets.  
Fifth, IV coefficients show that share concentration led to markedly higher capital leverage,
measured by the asset/capital ratio. A one standard deviation increase in the (log) number of-32-
shareholders is associated with a 178 percent reduction in the asset-capital ratio. Similarly, the
presence of a single shareholder controlling 20 percent or more of a bank’s shares is associated with
a 363 percent increase in the ratio. 
Capital  leverage  is  where  conflict  between  managers  and  owners  is  likely  to  be  most
pronounced. Rose-Ackerman (1991) argues that managers have a lower tolerance for potential
bankruptcy than shareholders. Accepted wisdom holds that diversified shareholders prefer greater
variance in returns and accept the possibility of a negative return on some assets as part of a well-
diversified portfolio. Absent information on the portfolios of large and small shareholders, it is
difficult to know much about their relative preferences for risk, but it is reasonable to infer from the
results that large shareholders had a greater taste for bankruptcy risk than small shareholders.
Because the principal asset was personal and business loans of (small) shareholders, the markedly
higher ratios under more concentrated ownership imply that large shareholders may have traded
increased bankruptcy risk for greater access to the bank’s credit. Contemporary legislators and
regulators may have been rational in their concerns over concentrated ownership. Recent events
demonstrate that modest economic downturns can quickly expose the fragility of highly levered
financial institutions. Economic downturns and bank crises were more common in the nineteenth
century and any regulatory device likely to reduce their incidence was viewed positively. 
6. Concluding remarks
An  enduring  interest  in  the  relationship  between  development  and  institutions  has  led
economic historians to study the emergence, adoption, and spread of the Old World corporation in
the New World (Handlin and Handlin 1945; Maier 1993; Dunlavy 2004; Lamoreaux 2004; Guinnane-33-
et al 2007; Hilt 2008; Harris 2009; Wright 2011). While the belief in American exceptionalism is often
unwarranted, in the case of the corporation the United States was exceptional. Even while it restricted
the ability of incorporators to alter the internal nexus of contracts, there were more corporations in
the United States circa 1840 than anywhere else, including England (Sylla 1998; Lamoreaux 2004).
The financial sector was the principal beneficiary of America’s corporate liberalism. Financial
development and depth were greater in nineteenth century America than  elsewhere, including
England. But the spread of the corporation was not without its contemporary detractors and even
advocates believed that corporations would generate widespread benefits only if they were well-
regulated  and  well-managed.  To  increase  the  likelihood  of  having  well-managed  institutions,
nineteenth-century Americans imposed a host of controls including limiting the power of majority
shareholders to bend the corporation to their will.
Berle and Means’ (1932) concern with the separation of ownership and control in the large
modern corporation established a lasting and productive research agenda for the modern era. Their
concern  with  dispersed  owners  and  unaccountable  managers,  however,  does  not  describe  the
concerns of early nineteenth-century observers. In the nineteenth century, the principal concern was
with minority control and it appears that the fears, at least in the financial sector, were reasonable.
Concerns with majority shareholder expropriation led many states to adopt graduated voting rules
and impose other limits on the number of votes large shareholders could cast in order to limit the
ability of large shareholders to loot, tunnel and otherwise expropriate at the expense of small
shareholders. 
Graduated voting rights were not just so much political window dressing to blunt Republican
criticisms of the undemocratic corporation. Graduated voting rights had real economic consequences.-34-
Such voting rules encouraged more diffuse ownership – surely a Republican objective – and altered
bank leverage and, by implication, bank risk taking. Bank runs were recurrent events in the early
nineteenth century, with notable crises in 1819, 1837, 1839 and 1857. To the extent that high
leverage created the conditions for and exacerbated the recessionary consequences of such crises,
voting  rules  assume  first-order  importance,  not  just  for  microeconomic  reasons,  but  for
macroeconomic outcomes as well. -35-
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Table 1: Summary statistics by voting rule
Variable N Full Sample
(N = 714)









































































Notes: Single Largest is the proportion of share owned by the single largest shareholder; Five Largest is the
proportion of shares owned by the five largest shareholders; Twenty Largest is the proportion of shares owned
by the 20 largest shareholders; Large Block 20 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the five largest shareholders
own more than 20% of the bank's shares; otherwise it equals zero. Bank age is date of observation minus date
established. 
Sources: see Data Appendix for shareholdings; other data from Weber (2011).-48-


































































































N  539 623 460 460 457 621 457
Adj R-square 0.56 0.46 0.51 0.43 0.49 0.45 0.25
F-statistic 138.8 108.9 94.7 70.3 87.1 101.6 32.1
Notes: Graduated voting rule includes instances in which votes increases less than linearly with shares, instances in which limits were placed on the
maximum number of votes a shareholder might cast, and instances in which both were operative. Nearly all cases of graduated voting included limits so
they are combined into a single variable. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.  Standard errors corrected for clustering on city.
Sources: see Table 1.-49--50-
Table 3: Share concentration and bank leverage


















































D-M test stat 5.67** 2.85** 3.36**
Twenty
Largest























































D-M test stat 5.53** 2.82** 3.44**Table 3: Share concentration and bank leverage







OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
-51-
Notes: First-stage regressions reported in Table 2. All regressions (OLS and IV) include Bank Age, Bank
Capital, Free Bank, ln(population) and a constant. All standard errors corrected for clustering city. Absolute
values of t-statistics reported in parentheses. Davidson-McKinnon test statistic is the t-statistic on the predicted
value of the endogenous regressor included in the augmented OLS regressions. A statistically significant value
of the D-M test statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the OLS estimator is consistent. With a single
instrument, the equation is just identified. ** implies p < 0.01. 
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Figure 1: Alternative graduated voting rights regimes
This figure plots the number of shares on the horizontal axis and the corresponding number of
votes on the vertical axis. New York's one share-one vote rule establishes the 45-degree line. The
other states present cases where shares and votes do not increase 1 for 1. Rhode Island placed a




























Figure 2: Distribution of share holdings in Maine and New York-54-
Table A1: Data on bank shareholdings by state and decade, 1810-1865
Shareholding data by state and decade
1810s 1820s 1830s 1840s 1850s 1860s Total
CT 1 1 2
IN 18 18
KY 1 1 2
LA 1 1
MA 1 1 83 79 164
ME 145 145
MI 5 1 6
NH 33 22 55
NY 2 56 2 40 100
OH 1 13 24 38
PA 33 33
TN 1 1
VT 1 1 2
WI 125 19 144
Total 33 2 68 195 313 99 711